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United States v. Jacobsen: Expanded Private
Search Doctrine Undermining Fourth
Amendment Values
INTRODUCTION

The fourth amendment was originally adopted to protect against
arbitrary invasions of an individual's privacy. 1 The amendment's
proscriptions, however, only pertain to governmental activities. 2
Therefore, intrusive activity conducted by a private party does not
fall within the ambit of the amendment.3
It has been held, however, that a governmental search or seizure
which follows a private party intrusion may, in some cases, violate
the fourth amendment.4 The federal circuit courts have adopted
varying analytical approaches to this issue. Some circuits have
found that governmental invasions which follow private intrusions
constitute fourth amendment activity while other circuits have
held otherwise.'
Recently, the Supreme Court determined that a governmental
search which is preceded by a private party's intrusion does not fall
within the fourth amendment's proscriptions. In United States v.
Jacobsen,6 the Court held that the governmental activity at issue
there did not constitute a search because the activity remained
within the scope of the private search and did not infringe upon
any legitimate expectation of privacy. The Court also found that
an on-the-spot testing of a package's contents by a government
agent was not tantamount to a fourth amendment search.7
The Jacobsen decision may serve to eliminate any warrant or
reasonableness requirement in most governmental searches following private activity.' Moreover, the decision may endanger fourth
amendment privacy interests through its blanket removal of a par1. See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text.
3. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). After closely examining the history of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court concluded that the amendment's purpose was the prohibition of governmental activity only. Id. at 467.
4. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
6. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
7. Id. at 1663; see infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 35-38, 173-76 and accompanying text; see also Burkoff, Not so
Private Searches and the Constitution, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 627 (1981) (exemption of
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ticular testing technique from the fourth amendment's scope.9
This note will discuss the development of the fourth amendment
and the scope of its protection and application. Next, United
States v. Jacobsen will be analyzed in light of Supreme Court precedent. Finally, the ramifications of Jacobsen's holding will be
presented. This note'suggests that a more traditional fourth
amendment analysis is preferable to the Jacobsen approach and
would better preserve the fundamental interests which the fourth
amendment protects.
BACKGROUND

The fourth amendment, as initially drafted' ° and currently interpreted, prohibits unreasonable and arbitrary governmental privacy
invasions. The first clause establishes the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures." The second clause of the
fourth amendment, the warrant clause, requires that the issuance
of a warrant be supported by probable cause as to a specific person
to be seized or place to be searched.12 The purpose of the warrant
requirement stems from the need to have a neutral
party define the
13
scope of and authorize the intrusive activity.
The fourth amendment proscribes physical invasions of protected property interests, whether tangible or intangible, in which
14
an individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy.
private action from fourth amendment regulation permits the government to do indirectly what it may not do directly).
9. See infra notes 142-46, 184-87 and accompanying text.
10. American colonists drafted the fourth amendment in response to their abhorrence
for the constant privacy invasions which resulted from the routine issuance of writs of
assistance. Writs of assistance were general search warrants issued by justices of the
peace which conferred additional powers upon constables. The writs were issued primarily so that the officers could effectively combat smuggling. For a detailed discussion of
common law search and seizure principles, see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980);
1 W.R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 1.1 (1978).
11. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 751, 753 (1979) (Court stated that the
magistrate monitors potentially intrusive activity and delineates the scope of approved
search within the warrant); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)
(Court held that the function of the detached magistrate in issuing search warrants is to
safeguard against hasty, aggressive police activity).
14. Historically, the fourth amendment protected property interests by proscribing
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Although the Court has explicitly stated that the fourth amendment protects people, not places, 5 it has consistently afforded full
protection to privacy interests in private dwellings, 6 telephone
booths,' 7 sealed containers 8 and first class mail.' 9 On the other
hand, no reasonable expectation of privacy has been recognized in
voluntary conversations, 20 the placement of telephone calls, 2 1
physical invasions of tangible private areas. Originally, the protected areas included only
those physical areas specifically enumerated in the text of the fourth amendment. See,
e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1961). This narrow definition of
protected privacy interests generally prompted a denial of fourth amendment protection
to non-property areas. See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (fourth
amendment claim based upon the use of a dictaphone was denied since no trespass was
alleged); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (no fourth amendment protection against police tapping defendant's home absent physical invasion); Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (distinctions made between open fields and "persons,
houses, papers and effects").
In the landmark decision of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Supreme
Court declared that an individual's privacy rights extend beyond the concept of property
interests to encompass all areas, whether tangible or intangible, in which an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Katz involved a fourth amendment violation
based upon an FBI surveillance of a public phone booth. The Supreme Court declared
that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," and that people have a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to telephone conversations conducted in private
phone booths. Id. at 351. Although the new privacy analysis of Katz appeared to
broaden the fourth amendment's scope, its ultimate result may be to substantially reduce
its reach. See Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN L. REV. 349,
460 (1974) (if Katz expectation analysis is applied in an unrestrained manner there may
be less protection for defendant); see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 533 (1974) (no
fourth amendment violation resulted from police activity of scraping paint from the defendant's car). For a discussion of Katz and the reasonable expectation of privacy standard see, e.g., Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 154 (1977).

15. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (sanctity of a private
dwelling may not be disturbed by execution of an arrest warrant issued in pursuit of
person other than the home owner); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrantless invasion into a clearly defined privacy zone such as a home constitutes a fourth
amendment violation).
17. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (a person placing a call from
a telephone booth possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation conducted within the booth).
18. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (the search of private property
must generally be both reasonable and pursuant to a warrant); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (letters and sealed packages are protected by the fourth
amendment).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (postal authorities
permitted to detain a package for 29 hours for purposes of obtaining a warrant).
20. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (electronic surveillance of
voluntary conversations between defendant and an informant does not result in fourth
amendment violation); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (defendant's trust in
an accomplice does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy which would be infringed by the accomplice's delivery of incriminating information to the government).
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banking records 22 and open fields. 23 The Court has developed a
two-step test for determining whether an individual possesses a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a seized item. First, an individual must have an actual, subjective expectation of privacy.24
Second, this subjective expectation must be one which society recognizes as "reasonable.

' 25

Existing customs, social policies and

21. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). There the Court concluded
that governmental use of a pen register device did not violate the fourth amendment. Id.
at 745-46. The Court held that the governmental conduct was not a search because no
reasonable expectation of privacy exists on numbers dialed from a particular telephone.
Id.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), where the Court found that
no legitimate expectation of privacy exists in the contents of banking documentation.
The Court based its holding upon two primary considerations. First, the information,
which was voluntarily conveyed to the bank in the ordinary course of business, was accessible to all bank employees. Thus, making the information available to a third party
created a risk of disclosure to the government or other parties. Id. at 443. Second, the
nature of the documents, as instruments of commercial transactions, manifests the absence of any secrecy expectation with relation to their contents. Id. at 442. See infra
notes 28-30 and accompanying text for discussion of the Miller case.
But see Illinois v. Jackson, 116 Ill. App. 3d 430, 452 N.E.2d 85 (1983). The Illinois
approach conflicts with that of Miller. In Jackson the court held that by issuing a grand
jury subpoena to an Illinois bank, the state violated defendant's constitutional right to
privacy under the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court refused to deem the
transfer of banking information to the bank a waiver of a privacy expectation in the
contents of the records. Id. at 435, 452 N.E.2d at 89.
23. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 1735 (1984). The Court ruled that
society recognizes no expectation of privacy in open fields, whether or not "no trespassing" signs are posted. Id. at 1742-43. The public may view open land notwithstanding
the owner's placement of signs upon the property. Id. at 1741. Thus, the fourth amendment does not protect an individual against a governmental search of open fields. Only
areas immediately adjacent to a home, known as the "curtilage," deserve fourth amendment proection. Id. at 1742.
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The subjective expectation appears to be minimally important to the overall privacy analysis as a result of the recognition of its obvious practical vulnerabilities. For example, a public announcement by the
government denying a privacy interest in a particular place or object effectively destroys
the subjective privacy expectation; Amsterdam, supra note 14, at 384. See also United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting), where Justice Harlan,
the originator of the two-step analysis, conceded that the objective privacy considerations
supersede any assessment of subjective expectations.
The subjective tests have nevertheless been consistently incorporated into the analysis.
United States v. Walter, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (consignor of a secure package possessed as
great a privacy expectation as the owner of a locked suitcase); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1 (1977) (respondents manifested an expectation that contents would remain
free from public examination by putting personal belongings inside a double-locked footlocker). But see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (whether or not a particular
defendant relied on the discretion of a companion does not enter into the consideration of
a privacy exectation).
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (the
fourth amendment protects homes because a "reasonable" expectation of privacy is asso-
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norms determine which privacy expectations are reasonable.26
The Court will deny fourth amendment protection when it concludes that no reasonable subjective expectation of privacy is involved. 27 For example, in United States v. Miller,28 the Supreme
Court declared that a bank depositor has no protectible fourth
amendment interest in bank records. The Court reasoned that a
person cannot subjectively expect that what he knowingly tells a
third party will, in every case, remain secret. 29 It also emphasized
that no objective privacy expectation exists to protect against the
risk that information relayed to another may be eventually given to
the government.3 °
Once it has been found that the fourth amendment protects a
particular area in a specific case, the government's conduct should
be examined to determine whether that activity infringed upon the
privacy interest.31 Where no reasonable expectation of privacy is
infringed upon, the governmental conduct is not a fourth amendment search or seizure.32 Recently, in United States v. Place,33 the
Court considered whether subjecting luggage to a canine sniff test
for contraband was a "search." The Court found that no search
had transpired in light of the minimally intrusive nature of the test
34
and the narrow scope of the information revealed by the test. If
it is established that a fourth amendment search or seizure has occurred, the activity must be examined to determine whether the
ciated with private dwellings); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (the owner
of a footlocker enjoys a "reasonable" expectation of privacy in the locker).
26. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1981) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (privacy
expectations reflect the customs and values of the existing society); see also A. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 131 (1967) (each society's political system contributes to the
balancing of privacy interests, surveillance needs and the level of disclosure required).
27. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 533 (1974). In holding that a fourth
amendment violation did not occur because a police officer scraped paint from the defendant's car, the Court stated that the activity did not infringe upon any expectation of
privacy. Id. at 591-92.
28. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
29. Id. at 442.
30. Id. The depositor takes the risk that the financial information he reveals to the
bank may be relayed to the government. The risk remains notwithstanding the depositor's reliance on the discretion of the third party to maintain the established confidence.
Id.
31. See, e.g., 1 W. R. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at § 2.1 (law enforcement practices do
not fall within the scope of the fourth amendment unless they are either a search or
seizure within the meaning of the amendment); Amsterdam, supra note 14, at 388 (governmental activity which is not a fourth amendment search or seizure need not be
reasonable).
32. See supra note 27.
33. 103 S.Ct. 2637 (1983).
34. Id. at 2644.
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fourth amendment's normal proscriptions against unreasonable
and warrantless searches and seizures apply 35 or whether a judicially recognized exception to these proscriptions exists.
Traditionally, the Court has held that searches and seizures conducted without the issuance of a warrant are unreasonable unless
the activity falls within one of the well-delineated exceptions to the
warrant requirement.36 The Court in the past has recognized,
however, that certain searches and seizures, conducted without
probable cause, which do not fall within one of the exceptions, may
not violate the fourth amendment if the conduct is "reasonable."
Under this view, the reasonableness of a search or seizure depends
upon the nature of the governmental interest at stake and the intrusiveness of the activity. 37 A balancing of those competing interests permits the Court to uphold reasonable searches and seizures
conducted without probable cause.38
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
The Court has created several exceptions to the warrant requirement. Some well-established exceptions include search incident to
a lawful arrest,39 search authorized by consent, 4° hot pursuit,4 1 the
35. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979) (under normal circumstances, a fourth amendment search must be reasonable and pursuant to a warrant); 1
W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at § 2.1 (traditionally the fourth amendment requires that
a search must only be conducted pursuant to a warrant).
36. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process without prior approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions." Id. at 357; see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
(in certain exigent situations the warrant requirement is not enforced); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies, the
search or seizure is per se unreasonable); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)
(magistrate's prior approval of search or seizure may only be circumvented in exceptional
situation); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (warrantless search of a home is
unlawful absent a search incident to arrest situation or the existence of any other
exception).
37. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, the inspection
by a municipal health inspector was scrutinized to determine whether the purpose of the
inspection justified the scope of the intrusion. The Court balanced the need for administrative searches against the degree of the intrusion and concluded that the significant
public interests at stake outweighed the intrusiveness of the searches. Id. at 537. Thus,
area inspections were deemed to be "reasonable" under the fourth amendment. Id. at
538.
38. See 1 W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at § 2.1.
39. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (upholding the search of the
entire automobile, including all compartments and clothing items); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969) (police officer may search the area within immediate control of the
arrestee for weapons or evidence of a crime).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (no fourth amendment
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automobile exception,42 plain view observation,4 3 and customs
searches." These exceptions were formulated partially in response
to the determination by the Court that not all warrantless searches
are unreasonable.45
One exception to the warrant requirement, the "plain view" doctrine, requires that the initial governmental intrusion be justified
and that the subsequent search or seizure be based upon probable
cause to associate an item which is in "plain view" with criminal
interest infringed by the installation of a beeper in cans of ether delivered to the defendant
where the seller consented to the installation); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973) (a finding of consent requires determination that the individual voluntarily acquiesced to the search upon examination of all the circumstances).
41. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (police may enter a home and
conduct a warrantless search if in hot pursuit of an armed suspect).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (warrantless search of defendant's car upheld notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was under arrest and in
custody); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (Court first recognized that a warrantless search of an automobile may be reasonable in certain circumstances); see also
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 751 (1979). There, the Court noted that the primary
distinctions between the automobile and other private property are the inherent mobility
of an automobile, which makes it impracticable to always obtain a warrant, and the
diminished privacy expectation in automobiles. Id. at 761. The Court further recognized
the fact that the automobile exception, along with the other well-established exceptions to
the warrant requirement, provides for situations in which the societal costs of requiring a
warrant, such as loss of evidence or danger to the officer, outweigh the reasons for prior
judicial approval. Id. at 759-60. In subsequent Supreme Court decisions, however, the
mobility focus was abandoned and the warrantless search of automobiles was justified by
the diminished privacy expectation in cars. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (owner of an automobile enjoys a limited privacy expectation because the car is used for transportation and the occupants and contents are visible); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 425 (1981) (expectation of privacy in autobmbiles is
diminished). The shift served to permit the liberal application of the exception, even in
situations in which no possibility existed that the car would be driven into another jurisdiction or the evidence would be destroyed. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982) (warrantless search of defandant's car at police headquarters upheld).
43. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). According to the
Coolidge Court, the plain view exception to the warrant requirement requires that the
initial intrusion be justified. Id. at 468. In addition, the police must inadvertently discover the incriminating evidence and the object must immediately indicate to the police
that it is contraband. Id. at 469. But see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). In Brown,
the Court approved of the application of the plain view exception when a police officer,
while conducting a routine license check, shined a fla.,hlight into a car interior. The
officer observed and then seized a balloon containing contraband. The Court ruled that
the establishment of probable cause to believe an item may be contraband may fulfill the
"immediately apparent" requirement. Id. at 741. The Brown majority futher noted that
plain view is simply an extension of the justification for the initial intrusion rather than an
independent exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 738-39.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621-22 (1977) (border search
exception is based upon the long standing right of a sovereign to protect itself by examining articles entering the country).
45. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968); see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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activity." Once justification for the initial intrusion and probable
cause for the seizure are established, the plain view doctrine operates to destroy any previously existing privacy interest in the
item.

The lawful discovery of contraband by customs agents similarly
operates to destroy the expectation of privacy in the package, according to the Court in Illinois v. Andreas.48 In Andreas, a package containing marijuana was initially searched and resealed by
airport customs agents, and then delivered to defendants under
controlled conditions.49 The Court found no fourth amendment
violation in light of the custom agents' initial justified observation
of the marijuana and the controlled delivery of the package to defendant's place of residence."
The Court noted that both the plain view and customs search
exceptions to the warrant requirement involve the destruction of
an individual's expectation of privacy when the government legitimately finds to a certainty that a package contains contraband.5 '
The Andreas Court found that the initial customs search justified
the subsequent warrantless search and seizure of the package in the
hallway of the defendant's home.52 According to the majority, the
privacy expectation was not revived in light of the constant surveillance of the package by police.5 3 The Andreas Court reasoned that
the extinguished expectation of privacy remained so because of the
high probability that no change of the package's contents oc46. Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3324 (1983); see supra note 43.
47. 103 S. Ct. at 3324.
48. Id. at 3319.
49. Id. at 3321-22.
50. The "controlled delivery" consisted of the DEA agents' personal delivery of the
package to defendant's residence, using a delivery van. The agents then entered the
apartment building and, pursuant to defendant's intructions, placed the package directly
outside defendant's door. Id. at 3322. While one agent secured a search warrant, another maintained watch within the apartment building. The agent failed to keep a constant watch of defendant's apartment entrance. Before a warrant was obtained, the agent
within the apartment building arrested the defendant after he attempted to leave the
building with the shipping crate. Id.
51. Id. at 3324.
52. Id. at 3323.
53. While admitting that the surveillance of the container was interrupted, the Court
relied on the statistical probabilities regarding the chances that the container's content
was altered before the second "search." Id. at 3324. The Court further recognized that,
although a previously destroyed expectation of privacy may be revived by an extended
break in surveillance, such was not the case here because it was highly unlikely that the
contents of the container had changed in light of the container's size, the brevity of the
break in surveillance, and the unique characteristics of the container. Id. at 3325.
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4

Therefore, no fourth amendment violation resulted.

5

Exclusionary Rule
To enforce the fourth amendment and to ensure the inviolability
of legitimate privacy expectations, the Court fashioned the exclusionary rule.5 6 The rule requires the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence from judicial proceedings.57 Originally, the exclusionary
rule primarily served to maintain judicial integrity by prohibiting
convictions based upon conduct which violated constitutional
mandates.5" Gradually, however, the courts used the rule to deter
illegal police activity.
In recent years, the Court has shown some antipathy toward the
social and judicial costs associated with excluding probative evidence. 59 The Court has begun to restrict the application of the ex6
clusionary rule by narrowly defining fourth amendment standing 0
54. The Court also stated that the "claim to privacy" in a container is lost when it is
known to a certainty that the container holds contraband. Id. at 3323.
55. Id. at 3325.
56. The exclusionary rule was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusion of illegally seized evidence from judicial proceedings was precipitated by the need for a judicial device which would encourage compliance with the warrant and probable cause requirements. Id. at 392. The importance of
protecting fourth amendment interests prompted the Court to apply the exclusionary rule
to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
57. For a general discussion of the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., W. RINGEL,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 1.3; see also Amsterdam, supra
note 14, at 416 (suggesting an alternative method of protecting fourth amendment
interests).
58. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (to preserve judicial integrity, government officals may not secure convictions of private persons by engaging in
illegal activities themselves); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (to uphold a
conviction based on illegally obtained evidence would contradict constitutional
guarantees).
59. In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984), the Supreme Court for the
first time created an exception to the application of the exclusionary rule in a situation
where a defective warrant was the basis for a search. The Court concluded that suppressing evidence because of judicial error would not serve to deter unlawful police
searches and seizures. Id. at 3428-29; see also Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984)
(suppression of evidence would only undermine the adversary system); People v. Defore,
242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926); Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380
(1984). In Segura, the petitioner argued for the suppression of the evidence since his
apartment was initially searched illegally. The illegal search revealed drug paraphenalia.
The Court upheld a subsequent search which was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant
since the warrant was secured on grounds entirely independent of the prior illegal search.
Id. at 3391-92. The Court also emphasized the need for promoting effective police investigation. Id. at 3392.
60. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, the defendants were
denied standing to bring a fourth amendment claim based on the warrantless search of
the automobile in which they were passengers. The Court reasoned that the defendants,
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and by permitting governmental use of illegally obtained evidence
in several situations.6 In addition, courts have broadly applied the
private search doctrine.
PrivateSearches
The Supreme Court has consistently construed the fourth
amendment as prohibitive of arbitrary invasions of privacy by governmental agents, not by private parties.62 This established exemption of private searches stems from the historical development of
the amendment as well as practical considerations regarding the
amendment's application. The framers drafted the fourth amendment in response to their abhorrence of the routine issuance of
possessing neither a "property nor possessory interest in the automobile," had no expectation of privacy in the automobile and, therefore, could not contest the warrantless
search. Id. at 148. Similarly, in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), petitioner
was denied standing to contest the warrantless seizure of drugs found in the purse of an
acquaintance. The Court did not consider the petitioner's ownership interest in the substance to be of any significance in determining the issue of standing. Instead, the Court
focused upon the petitioner's privacy expectation in the purse in which the substance was
found, concluding that since the petitioner did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse, he could not challenge the legality of the search. Id. at 104; see also
United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (automatic standing not granted to defendant charged with a possessory offense).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). The Court in Havens
found that the policies of the exclusionary rule would be furthered by forbidding the
governmental use of illegally obtained evidence during its case-in-chief. Id. at 626. It
also found, however, that disallowing the use of excluded evidence for impeachment purposes would perhaps only incrementally further the rule's end. Thus, evidence suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure may be used during crossexamination to impeach defendant's false testimony. Id. at 627-28. Further, in United
States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980), it was held that although the exclusionary rule
prohibits the use of evidence derived from the illegal activity, it does not operate to suppress evidence possessed by police prior to the inception of the illegality. In Crews, police
had already linked the defendant with the crime. Thus, the in-court identification of a
defendant need not be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest. Id. at 477. Finally, in
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), it was held that the exclusionary rule
would seriously impede the grand jury in its discovery process and that the deterrent
effect on police misconduct which would result from excluding evidence from grand jury
proceedings was negligible. Id. at 351. The police, aware that evidence will be suppressed during criminal proceedings, would not engage in illegal investigative activity
solely for indictment purposes. Id. Thus, the exclusionary rule was held to be inapplicable during grand jury proceedings. Id. at 354.
62. See, e.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (wrongful private search
does not violate the fourth amendment); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971) (wife's voluntary delivery to police of evidence against her husband upheld and
evidence admitted); United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1982) (agent of freight
carrier may conduct a search free of fourth amendment implications); United States v.
Edwards, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979) (airline employee's search of package did not
violate of the fourth amendment notwithstanding federal law obligating air carriers to
inspect packages).
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writs of assistance which enabled governmental officials to indiscriminately search private dwellings for evidence of smuggling.63
Additionally, applying the amendment to private action and employing the exclusionary rule to suppress the fruits of the search or
seizure would not further the currently recognized purpose of the
fourth amendment: the regulation of police activity.6
The private search doctrine, a firmly established principle of
fourth amendment law, eliminates any fourth amendment analysis. 6 ' The fourth amendment provides no protection against unreasonable, warrantless searches and seizures conducted by private
parties.6 6 Incriminating evidence discovered by private parties is
freely admissible in judicial proceedings. 67 The courts have employed a private search analysis to admit evidence obtained
through searches conducted by a freight company, 68 an airline employee,6 9 a motel proprietor,70 and a college security officer.71
63. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Comment, The Fourth Amendment Following Private Searches: Is
There a PrivacyInterest to Protect?,52 U. CIN. L. REv. 172, 176 (1983) (when the motive
for a private search is not to obtain a criminal conviction, deterrence of neither the private party nor government agents will result from the exclusion of the evidence); see also
1 W.R. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at § 1.6. The exclusionary rule would not be functional
in private search situations because a private entity seldom is induced to conduct searches
in order to gather evidence against another individual. Id. Also, the rule itself is premised upon the inequities associated with allowing police to profit from unconstitutional
activity. Id. But see Burkoff, supra note 8, at 636 (exclusion of evidence obtained during
illegal private searches would deter law enforcement officers from remotely encouraging
such private activity).
65. See, e.g., Burkoff, supra note 8, at 627-28.
66. E.g., Note, PrivateSearches and Seizures: Application of the PublicFunction Theory, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 433, 434-35 (1980).
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (obscene
films admissible against the defendant although federal agents viewed films without a
warrant after a private carrier's agent opened the shipment); People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal.
3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1982) (no fourth amendment activity found
regarding officer's warrantless opening of a package after being informed by freight agent
that the package may contain contraband).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Blanton, 479 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1973) (airline employee's search of an unclaimed bag does not implicate fourth amendment protection);
United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1973) (search of unclaimed baggage constituted a private search and was not a fourth amendment violation).
70. See, e.g., People v. Warner, 65 Mich. App. 267, 237 N.W.2d 284 (1975) (hotel
clerk's monitoring of guest's telephone conversation held not to be a fourth amendment
violation).
71. See, e.g., People v. Boettner, 80 Misc. 2d 3, 362 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
There, the court held that evidence of contraband discovered during search of college
rooms was admissible against the defendant even though the search by college employees
was prompted by police. The state police had initially informed college officials that the
defendant might possess marijuana.
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However, the scope of the private search doctrine is not boundless.
A fourth amendment analysis may be triggered by the government's involvement in the private search through the use of inducement tactics, whether such involvement be direct or indirect.72
In addition, fourth amendment scrutiny may be warranted if the
private party's conduct is accompanied by either simultaneous
74
assistance by the government 73 or, as in United States v. Jacobsen,
a subsequent additional search."
The Supreme Court developed the analysis for cases involving
governmental searches which follow private searches in Walter v.
United States.76 In Walter, a private party opened a misdelivered
box and discovered film contained in packages covered with suggestive drawings and obscene descriptions of each film. 77 The pri-

vate carrier delivered the carton to FBI agents, who subsequently
viewed the film without obtaining a search warrant.78 The Court
72. The private search doctrine does not apply to searches instigated by government
agents. See, e.g., United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975) (fourth amendment search was conducted where airline employees and government agents jointly
opened luggage); United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (airport search was
required by government as an anti-hijacking procedure); People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d
590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955) (installation of a microphone in defendant's room by a private
engineer hired by the district attorney violated the fourth amendment).
73. See, e.g., Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949). The Lustig Court stated
that whether the fourth amendment applies depends upon the share of the federal officer
in the "total enterprise." Id. at 79; see also United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.
1975) (telephone company supervisor was not acting as agent of government by monitoring phone calls where government had no prior knowledge of supervisor's activities);
Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (detective and private party joined
in a search of defendant's apartment, thus violating the fourth amendment); Stapleton v.
Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1968) (search of car by
credit card agents constituted fourth amendment activity since police were instrumental
in planning search and were present while search took place). But see United States v.
Burton, 475 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1973) (search of luggage by airlines deemed to be a private
search notwithstanding the FAA's directives); United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467 (3d
Cir. 1973) (airline freight company employee's search of two suitcases was outside the
scope of the fourth amendment, even though the employee, on a prior occasion, had been
compensated by the government for giving information to customs agents); Gold v.
United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967) (search of cartons, after FBI expressed suspicions with respect to their contents, held not to be fourth amendment activity since there
was no explicit "request" that the manager search the carton).
74. 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Haes, 551 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1977) (FBI viewing of
films discovered during a private search constituted a fourth amendment search); United
States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1976) (although the initial search was conducted
without governmental involvement, the subsequent search by the government violated
the fourth amendment).
76. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
77. Id. at 653.
78. Id. at 652.
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held that the search violated the fourth amendment because no
warrant had been obtained.79 In defining the scope of the private
search and its relation to the government's activity, ° the Court
determined that the viewing of the film by the government was a
separate search because it exceeded the scope of the private
search."' Subsequent decisions in this area have implemented the
Walter test by scrutinizing the governmental activity in light of the
private search's scope.8 2 However, no clearly defined interpretation of Walter has resulted.
For example, in United States v. Barry3 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit validated a warrantless governmental search and seizure of the defendant's package and the subsequent testing of its contents. The government justified its search
of the package on the grounds that the initial intrusion was a private search, and therefore exempt from the fourth amendment requirements.84 The court determined, however, that the Drug
Enforcement Agency ("DEA") agent unlawfully seized the package's contents because the seizure occurred without a warrant and
79. Id.'at 654.
80. Id. at 657. The Court derived this analysis from the general premise that the
search's scope must be limited to the realm of its authorization. Id. at 656-57. In employing this doctrine in the private search area, the Court noted: "If a properly authorized official search is limited by the particular terms of its authorization, at least the same
kind of strict limitation must be applied to any official use of a private party's invasion of
another person's privacy." Id. at 657.
81. Id. The Court stated that although the FBI agents may have lawfully possessed
the suspicious packages of film, the authority to detain was not synonymous with the
authority to search. Id. at 654. Because the private search merely frustrated the existing
privacy interest in part, the governmental search infringed upon the remaining fourth
amendment interest. Id. at 659.
82. See, e.g., People v. Adler, 50 N.Y.2d 730, 409 N.E.2d 888 (1980) (warrantless
police search of a parcel initially searched by an airline employee upheld because the
police did not go beyond the private search); State v. Glade, 61 Or. App. 723, 659 P.2d
406 (1983) (officer's examination of a package initially opened by a private air freight
agent upheld because it did not significantly expand the private search); State v. Morgan,
32 Wash. App. 764, 650 P.2d 228 (1982) (removal and testing of powder from a package
previously opened by a private carrier agent exceeded the scope of the private search and
thus violated the fourth amendment).
83. 673 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1982).
84. Id. at 915. The defendant argued that Federal Express' search of the package was
a governmental rather than a private search. In support of his assertion, the defendant
argued that the carrier opened the parcel solely to search for drugs. Id. The defendant
offered a memorandum prepared by an agent of the company which urged all employees
to cooperate with the DEA in policing drug traffic. The memo included a warning to
employees that they may not open suspicious packages unless their actions could be justified pursuant to company policy. Id. The court rejected the defendant's argument by
finding that the memorandum alone did not "cloak the company's actions with a federal
purpose," and, in any case, the carrier's agent discovered the contraband during the
work-related event of repackaging a damaged shipment. Id.
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no established exception to the warrant requirement applied. 5
The seizure was nonetheless upheld because the defendant had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contraband at the time
of the seizure.8 6 This finding was premised upon an assumption of
risk rationale under which the defendant, by consigning his package to the private carrier, accepted any risk that the carrier might
open the package. a7 The defendant's failure to adequately conceal
the package's contents was an additional basis for denying the de88
fendant's privacy expectation in the package.
The Sixth Circuit also concluded that the testing of the pills
found inside the package did not constitute a search and therefore
did not violate the fourth amendment.8 9 In so doing, the court
rejected the defendant's contentions that the facts in the case were
analogous to those in Walter and that the testing constituted a warrantless search in violation of the fourth amendment.' The Barry
Court distinguished Walter by noting that first amendment principles were at 'stake in Walter.91 Another distinguishing factor
stemmed from the difference in the scale of the respective investigative techniques. In Barry, the DEA agent chemically tested a
sample from the package, whereas in Walter the governmental official viewed the films found in the shipment.2 The Barry court
85. Id. at 916. The court interpreted Supreme Court precedent in the area of search
and seizure law as calling for a two-fold analysis of the seizure. The evidence may only
be suppressed if the governmental conduct was unlawful and the defendant's fourth
amendment rights were violated. Since the Sixth Circuit concluded that the second
prong was not met because no privacy infringement occurred, it held that the evidence
was admissible. The court rejected the government's attempt to apply the plain view
exception because the discovery of drugs by the federal agent was not inadvertent and no
exigencies prevented the government from obtaining a warrant. Id. at 918.
86. Id. at 919.
87. Id. The court stated that by delivering the package to the carrier for shipment,
the defendant "relinquished all control" over its contents. According to the court, Barry
should have been aware of the risk that his package may be opened; by consigning his
package, he assumed that risk. Id.
88. Id. The Barry court found that the defendant failed to take adequate precautions
to disguise the nature of the shipment. The defendant's failure to conceal the Methaqualone was illustrated by the packaging of the substance: the contraband was enclosed
in clear bottles labelled "Methaqualone." Id.
89. Id. at 919-20. The court categorized such chemical testing as a "perfunctory
test" which was at most routine. The court did not expound on its method of determining whether or not an investigative technique is so significant as to constitute a search.
90. Id. at 920.
91. Id. Although the court distinguished Walter on the first amendment protection
of the films seized, it did not explain its distinction between first and fourth amendment
analysis.
92. Id.
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considered the former governmental activity to be less intrusive. 93
In contrast, under a similar factual situation, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the government's
search of a package and field test of its contents violated the fourth
amendment. In United States v. Jacobsen,94 the private search revealed bags of powder and the government agent's search subsequently exposed the substance itself.9" Relying on Walter, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the governmental activity exceeded
the scope of the private search. 96 According to the Jacobsen court,
the private searches in both Walter and Jacobsen merely frustrated
the defendant's expectation of privacy and the subsequent government intrusions infringed upon each defendant's remaining privacy
interest.97
The Eighth Circuit further found that under Walter the field test
constituted an invalid warrantless search. 98 The court compared
the testing of the substance in Jacobsen with the viewipg of the film
in Walter and concluded that both activities significantly expanded
the breadth of the initial private invasion. 99 As separate searches,
the government's conduct required prior judicial approvalbo or the
justification of an exception to the warrant requirement.°10 The absence of a warrant or an exception to that requirement prompted
the Eighth Circuit to exclude the evidence obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment. 0 2 In light of the conflict among the circuits and the importance of field tests in the enforcement of laws
prohibiting narcotics, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
93. Id.
94. 683 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1652 (1984). For a comparative
analysis of the Eighth Circuit's Jacobsen decision and the Sixth Circuit's opinion in
Barry, see Note, United States v. Jacobsen: Exceeding the Scope of a Private Search, 28
S.D.L. REV. 231 (1982).
95. 683 F.2d at 297.
96. Id. at 299.
97. Id.
98. Id. In both Walter and Jacobsen the only legitimate way to infer criminal activity
would have been by viewing the objects with the unaided eye. The government agent in
each situation employed artficial investigative techniques to determine the nature of the
objects. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The court stressed the importance of the warrant requirement, citing
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). It further stated that the enforcement
of the warrant requirement should not be determined by examining the inconvenience to
police in obtaining the warrant. The warrant requirement operates as a check on overly
aggressive law enforcement officials. Id.
101. Id. at 300. No exigent circumstances existed nor was the government justified
by any exception to the warrant requirement. Id.
102. Id.
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The Facts
In Jacobsen, a freight agent, following a company policy directive, opened a damaged package in order to assess the amount of
damages." 4 The package contained a tube constructed out of silver duct tape. 0 Inside the tape, the employee discovered a series
of four plastic bags. The innermost bag contained a white powdery
substance.°6 The employee restored the tube and contents to their
original positions within the box and notified the DEA of his
findings. 107
Upon arrival, the DEA agent removed the tube from the box
and took a sample of the substance from the plastic bags in order
to conduct a field test of the powder. 0 8 After obtaining positive
results from the test, the agent obtained a search warrant for the
premises of the addressee of the package. Defendants were arrested in their home shortly after their receipt of the rewrapped
package. 109

At the trial, the defendants moved to suppress the evidence,
which was seized from the hallway outside their home by the DEA
agent, as fruits of an illegal search."' In denying the motion, the
district court took into account the magistrate's assertion that the
government's search did not exceed the scope of the private
search."' The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's hold103. United States v. Jacobsen, 103 S. Ct. 1271 (1983).
104. United States v. Jacobsen, 683 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1652
(1984). According to the Eighth Circuit, the manager examined the contents of the package which was damaged in transit. Id. In the Supreme Court's opinion, however, it was
noted that a post-trial affidavit alleged that the suspicious nature of the package, rather
than any damage, prompted the agent to examine its contents. 104 S. Ct. at 1657 n. 10.
Because the lower courts declined to recognize. any governmental participation in the
private search and the respondent failed to challenge this holding, the Supreme Court did
not consider the issue. Id.
105. 104 S. Ct. at 1655.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1654. The summary of the facts presented by the Supreme Court majority
indicates that the DEA agent removed the tubes from the box and then the bags from the
tube. Id. Justice White's concurring opinion, however, indicates that the magistrate
found that the "tube was in plain view in the box and the bags of white powder were
visible from the end of the tube." Id. at 1663 (White, J., concurring).
109. 683 F.2d at 298.
110. 104 S. Ct. at 1654.
111. 683 F.2d at 298.
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ing that the government conduct violated the fourth amendment,
finding that neither the government's reopening of the package nor
the testing
of the contents amounted to a fourth amendment
12
search.'
The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Stevens, observed at
the outset that a private carrier had initially opened the damaged
package.' 3 Under the private search doctrine, no fourth amendment violation arose from the private party's activity." 4 The majority then examined the governmental activity to determine
whether any illega! search or seizure had transpired.
The Court first examined the opening of the box by the DEA
agent to determine whether a fourth amendment search or seizure
had occurred. The majority employed the analysis of Walter v.
United States,I 5 comparing the scope of the private search to that
of the governmental invasion." 6 In so doing, it found that the
agent's act of removing the tube from the box did not constitute a
search because no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in the
unsealed package." 7 Further, the government had merely reaffirmed the findings of the private party; the agent's activity therefore remained within the scope of the private search.' " The Court
stated that its decision would remain consistent whether or not the
powder itself were plainly visible to the agent at the time he re119
moved it from the box.
The Court next examined the government's taking of the package and its enclosed substance, to determine whether a fourth
amendment seizure had occurred. Although the majority concluded that for fourth amendment purposes the government had
seized the package and its contents, the seizure was deemed reasonable because Jacobsen's privacy interests had already been compro112. 104 S. Ct. at 1653; see supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
113. 104 S. Ct. at 1657.
114. Id.; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
115. 447 U.S. 649 (1980); see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
116. 104 S. Ct. at 1657-58.
117. Id. at 1660. The Court also noted the fact that the package which had been
previously opened remained unsealed as further support for denying any reasonable expectation of privacy in the package. Id.
118. Id. at 1659.
119. Id. The Court noted that even if the powdery substance itself were not in plain
view, it was virtually certain that the package contained contraband. Thus, the government's inspection of the tube revealed no more to the agent than had been told to him by
the private party. Id. at 1660.
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mised by the private search.12 ° The majority relied upon the high
degree of certainty that the tube contained contraband as further
121
justification for the warrantless seizure.
Finally, the majority addressed the testing of the drug by the
DEA agent. The Court held that the testing was not a search proscribed by the fourth amendment because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in illegitimate materials. 122 The minimally
intrusive nature of the testing further precluded
any finding that a
123
occurred.
had
search
amendment
fourth
The majority found this result to be dictated by United States v.
Place,124 in which the Court had ruled that subjecting personal
property to a dog sniff test was not tantamount to a fourth amendment "search." 1 2' The Jacobsen majority viewed the Place test as
analogous to the field test of the powdery substance. Since no privacy interest was invaded by testing a potentially illegal substance,
and the field test would only reveal whether or not the
substance
126
was cocaine, no fourth amendment search took place.
In analyzing the field test in light of the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable seizures, the Court balanced the
degree of the intrusion with the nature of the governmental interests. 127 The seizure of the substance for testing purposes was held
reasonable in light of the minimal invasion of Jacobsen's property
interest 8and the compelling governmental interest in policing drug
12
traffic.
120. Id. The majority saw the issue of whether the seizure was reasonable as directly
related to the level of protection remaining in the package. Id.
121. Id. The Court compared the package to the balloon in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730 (1983), which had a distinctive character that spoke "volumes" as to its contents.
104 S.Ct. at 1661; see supra note 43.
122. 104 S.Ct. at 1661. The majority relied heavily upon the fact that the subjective
privacy expectation of a criminal is not sufficient to justify a "legitimate" privacy expectation. Id at 1662.
123. Id. at 1663.
124. 103 S.Ct. 2637 (1983).
125. Id. at 2644-46; see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
126. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1662. The majority relied heavily on the limited nature
of the field test in holding that no search had occurred. Id. The Court stated that if the
results of the field test are positive, no privacy interest is infringed upon. Likewise, the
majority averred that a negative result would then only reveal the absence of narcotics.
Id.
127. Id. at 1662. The Court utilized the search analysis employed earlier in Place,
where the Court validated a dog sniff test on the basis of the limited information revealed
and the minimal intrusiveness of the test. In Jacobsen the Court also removed the field
test from the ambit of the fourth amendment in light of the narrow scope of the test and
the negligible character of the intrusion. Id.
128. Id. The Jacobsen Court relied on Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 587 (1974), to
support its determination that the testing of the powder did not implicate the fourth
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The Concurring Opinion
Justice White's concurring opinion focused on the majority's
finding that regardless of whether the powdery substance was
plainly visible to the agent beforehand, no fourth amendment
search occurred when the DEA agent removed the contents of the
box. 129 Justice White also expressed concern with the broad application of the private search doctrine. The concurring opinion
pointed out the existence of a judicially recognized privacy interest
in closed containers and the impropriety of permitting probable
cause alone to justify a warrantless search. 30 The concurrence
compared the plain view exception to the warrant requirement and
the private search doctrine. In so doing, Justice White acknowledged the extinguishment of any privacy interest in a "plain view"
item, 3' but noted that a private search does not similarly destroy
any privacy expectation. 3 2 In Jacobsen, the government could not
therefore search the package solely on the basis of the carrier's testimony. 33 Although the carrier's information might establish
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, if the content of the
search would infringe
package was not in plain view, a warrantless
1 34
expectation.
privacy
Jacobsen's
upon
amendment because the seizure was reasonable. In Cardwell, the police scraped paint
from an impounded car based upon probable cause to believe that the owner of the car
may have committed a murder. In holding that the scraping was was a seizure, but a
reasonable one, the Court emphasized the distinctive nature of the automobile. Id. at
589-90. The Cardwell Court noted that, generally, less stringent fourth amendment requirements apply to cars as a result of the mobility factor. Id. The diminished nature of
the expectation of privacy in automobiles serves to lessen the potential intrusiveness of
any search or seizure. See supra note 42.
129. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1664 (White, J., concurring). Initially, Justice White
criticized the majority's failure to give unquestioning deference to the magistrate's determination that the substance was in plain view at the time the alleged search was conducted, noting that the respondents themselves accepted the magistrate's decision. Id. at
1664. Second, Justice White stated that if the Court finds the magistiate to be in error in
concluding that the powder was in plain view, the Court should remand the case for
review. Id. According to the concurrence, the district court and the court of appeals are
responsible for reconsidering the magistiate's findings. Id.
130. Id. at 1665 (White, J., concurring).
131. Id. (White, J., concurring).
132. Id. (White, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 1666 (White, J., concurring).
134. According to Justice White, the majority's conclusion that no reasonable privacy expectation existed ignored any subjective privacy expectation considerations. For
example, the owner of the opened package was unaware of the invasion at the time it
occurred. Id. at 1667 (White, J., concurring). The majority also stated that the reasonableness of the government intrusion should be judged according to the circumstances that
existed at the time of the invasion. Id. (White, J., concurring). The concurring opinion
used the majority's reasoning to note that the remaining expectation of privacy should
depend upon whether or not the private search clearly revealed incriminating evidence to
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The concurrence further expressed concern about the practical
implications of the majority's analysis. Justice White feared that as
a result of the majority's findings, no legitimate expectation of privacy would remain in a package once a private party had conducted a search. 135 The government would thus be free to conduct
warrantless searches without prior judicial review to determine
1 36
whether probable cause exists for such action.
The concurring opinion then addressed the proper test for governmental conduct following a private search. Justice White disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the Walter test.' 37 In
so doing, Justice White discounted the significance of the language
in Walter which appears to permit the government to imitate the
138
private search without ever violating the fourth amendment.
The concurrence noted that although Walter contained this troubling statement, that decision expressly refrained from deciding
whether a violation would have occurred had the private party actually viewed the film before the police viewed it. 139
The Dissent
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, also disagreed with
the majority's expansion of the private search doctrine to include
the DEA agent's activities."4 His dissent in Jacobsen reiterated
Justice White's determination that the reopening of the package
constituted a search if the contents were not in plain view.' 41 The
dissent also scrutinized the testing of the powdery substance under
the fourth amendment.
Although the dissent agreed with the majority that no search
had occurred from testing the drug, the dissent wholly disagreed
with the analysis upon which this finding was based. 4 2 According
to the dissent, the majority's analysis improperly excluded numerthe government. However, precedent did not support the assertion that the agent may
conduct a search "of the same or lesser scope as the private search" without a warrant.
Id. (White, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 1665-67 (White J. concurring).
136. Id. (White, J., concurring).
137. Id. (White, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 1666 (White, J., concurring). Although a private search may permit the
government to reexamine the materials left in plain view by the private party invasion,
the government may not exceed the scope of the private search without independent justification. Id. (White, J., concurring).
139. Id. (White, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 1667-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1667 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1668 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ous testing, surveillance and investigative methods from the confines of the fourth amendment by finding that no search had
occurred based solely upon the nature of the information revealed. 41 3 Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's validation
of the testing procedure both in Jacobsen and in United States v.
Place.' He found that both cases potentially validate future surveillance techniques which will be able to uncover contraband in a
home or on a passer-by without any physical invasion. 4 In addition, such an approach ignores fundamental fourth amendment
46
principles and well-established privacy expectation analysis.
The dissent asserted that a proper analysis requires the Court to
examine a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in the item.'47
The existence of an intrusion of a privacy expectation, in turn,
depends upon the context in which the item is found, not solely the
limited nature of the information revealed by the intrusion. 4 1 Unless the warrantless search could be justified under an exception
149
such as plain view,
the activity would constitute a fourth amend50
violation.
ment
THE SEARCH OF THE PACKAGE

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Analysis
The Jacobsen majority's finding of an absence of any privacy expectation conflicts with the Court's previous decisions. For example, in denying the owner's subjective and objective privacy
expectation, the Court relied on United States v. Miller.' Miller
stands for the proposition that a third party may reveal information entrusted to him by another to the government, which may, in
turn, use this information against the entruster. 5 2 Jacobsen inter143. Id. at 1669-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. 103 S.Ct. 2637 (1983).
145. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1669-70 (Brennan J., dissenting). The dissent feared
that under the fourth amendment scope as defined by the majority, the use of such testing
devices as a "cocaine detector" would not constitute a "search." Id. Thus, law enforcement officers could use these techniques freely without any limitations. Id.
146. Id. at 1671 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority incorrectly focused on the
product of the "would-be search" instead of examining the circumstances in which the
technique was employed, the accuracy of the technique's result, and the privacy expectation which is subjected to the intrusion. Id.; see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 1669 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1671 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1672 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1671 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
152. Id. at 442; see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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prets this to mean that a third party may reveal the contents of a
package to the goverment, who may then seize the package and use
its contents against the owner without implicating the fourth
amendment.153 Miller, however, is distinguishable on at least two
grounds. In Jacobsen, no information was voluntarily relayed to
the private carrier; rather, a sealed package was merely entrusted
to its care.' 54 In addition, in Miller, the Court flatly refused to
recognize any privacy expectation in bank documents,' 5 whereas
interest had been dein Jacobsen the Court stated that an existing
15 6
stroyed at the time of the private search.
The Jacobsen Court thus implicitly sanctioned the assumption of
risk rationale.' 57 Under the Sixth Circuit's theory, a reasonable
man could not expect to remain free from governmental intrusion
after delivery of the package to the carrier. 58 Consistent with that
approach, the Court in Jacobsen focused on the privacy interest at
the time of the private search, finding that private party activity
destroyed any reasonable expectation of privacy. 59 This approach
conflicts, however, with the Supreme Court's decision in Walter v.
United States, which stated that the privacy expectation must be
measured at the time of shipment.1' 6
Under the Walter rationale, the package should have been protected by the fourth amendment because the owner possessed a
reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents even after delivery
to the carrier. Although a carrier may have been justified in examining accidentally damaged packages, the owner could not reason153. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (1984).
154. See Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1666 (White, J., concurring). Justice White differentiated between risks which are assumed by a person who voluntarily reveals secrets to
another and a person whose possessions are subjected to a private search. See Amsterdam, supra note 14, at 406 (existence of risks should not permit the government to add to
them by acting in a "constitutionally unconstrained manner"); Comment, supra note 94,
at 240 (individual mailing a package manifests an expectation that the contents of the
package will remain free from public viewing).
155. 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
156. 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1659-60.
157. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text for an explanation of the assumption of risk concept.
158. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
160. 447 U.S. 649, 658 (1980). The Walter Court noted that at the time of shipment,
the cartons were well wrapped and tightly sealed. Thus, as of the time of shipment, the
defendant's full privacy expectation in the package remained intact. Id. at 658. In Jacobsen, it was noted that at the time of shipment, the package consisted of a box wrapped in
paper, containing a tube made of silver duct tape covered with several newspapers.
Within the tube were four zip-lock bags, the innermost bag containing a white powdery
substance. 104 S. Ct. at 1655.
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ably have expected the box to be opened at the time of shipment. 161
The private party's search of the box, moreover, may have diminished the owner's privacy expectation in its contents. The government should not, however, have automatically been allowed to
engage in warrantless activity 62unless a total frustration of the
owner's interest had occurred.
PrivateSearch Doctrine
The Court's conclusion that the private party's examination of
the package precluded fourth amendment protection is not com63
pelling when contrasted with its decision in Illinois v. Andreas.
In Andreas, the Court held that no fourth amendment search occurred when the government reopened a sealed package which had
been previously searched by custom officials."M In Andreas, the
initial invasion was justified by the authority of the customs agent
to search packages and luggage for contraband.' 65 The customs
search exception to the warrant requirement reflects the societal
interests in policing drug traffic and confiscating concealed weapons.' 66 Because the general interest in protecting society from the
dangers associated with contraband substantially outweighs the
limited intrusion associated with brief a detention67and customs
search, the exception was developed by the courts.
In contrast, the initial private intrusion in Jacobsen furthered no
law enforcement policy, but was made for purposes of assessing the
161. 447 U.S. at 658-59. The Walter Court explicitly described the care with which
the package had been wrapped to denote the person's subjective privacy expectations.
See supra note 160.
162. 447 U.S. at 659. The Walter Court equated the interest possessed by a consignor
of a sealed package with that of an owner of a locked suitcase. The unexpected opening
of a package by a third party does not affect the consignor's expectation of privacy. Id. at
658-59.
163. 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983).
164. Id. at 3325. The Court relied heavily on the assertion that the contents of the
package remained undisturbed from the time of the custom search to the time of the
second warrantless search. Since the initial customs search destroyed the reasonable privacy expectation, the Court concluded that the second search infringed on no privacy
interest. Id. at 3325; see supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979) (border searches
valid means for United States to protect "territorial integrity"); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 656 (1978) (border patrol checkpoint operations valid in light of strong governmental interest in policing smuggling); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977)
(United States government has the right to inspect all goods entering the country).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1983) (strong governmental interest in policing narcotics); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62
(1980) (government has strong interest in protecting public against drug traffic).
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package's damages. 6 Further, the private carrier's ability to examine packages without fourth amendment scrutiny results from
the principle that the fourth amendment only prohibits certain actions by government officials.1 69 In this context, in which the interests associated with customs searches are not at stake, the police
should not be encouraged to engage in warrantless searches under
the protection of an expanded private search doctrine.
Another distinguishing factor of Andreas relates to the events
which followed the "justified" initial intrusion. In Andreas, the
Court emphasized that the reopening of the package was preceded
by a positive police identification of the drug, a controlled delivery
and a period of continuous surveillance. 7 ' In Jacobsen, however,
the private party possessed mere suspicions about the discovered
substance, and the reopening of the package by the DEA agent was
based upon a tip from the carrier's agent.I7 Although the tip could
have supported a finding of probable cause, the Court had not previously eliminated the warrant requirement just because probable
cause to believe a package contains contraband existed. The private search may serve to establish probable cause for agents to confiscate the package and obtain a warrant, but the private search
doctrine does not exempt governmental activity from the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment. 7 2 Thus, Andreas simply
does not provide sound support for Jacobsen based upon an analogy between customs searches and private party searches.
Jacobsen's Interpretation of Walter v. United States
The Court further held that the DEA agent's conduct had not
exceeded the scope of the private party's search and thus did not
violate the fourth amendment.'
In so holding, the Court relied
upon its prior decision in Walter v. United States.' Walter established an analysis of governmental activity which compares the
168. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). The Burdeau Court stated
that it is clear from its origin and historical development that the fourth amendment only
protects against governmental searches and seizures. Id. at 475; see also Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886) (the founding fathers formulated the fourth amendment to guard against governmental intrusions). See supra notes 62-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the private search doctrine.
170. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 99-102, 132-34 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
174. 477 U.S. 649 (1980).
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scope of such activity with that of the private party. 17 5 Walter does
not, however, support Jacobsen's determination that the government may emulate the private party's actions without implicating
the fourth amendment. The Walter Court acknowledged that the
government may seize and reexamine contraband which remains in
plain view following a private search. It also emphasized, however, that unless such a well-established
exception existed, the war176
applied.
still
rant requirement
Jacobsen, however, was not decided on the basis of such an exception. In fact, the majority stated that since the private carrier
opened the package and found contraband, no privacy expectation
was infringed regardless of whether the substance was in plain
view. 177 While it is clear that the government may seize contraband in plain view, the Court had not previously extended this rationale to deny an expectation of privacy in a package where the
contents remained uncertain. 178 Plain view visibility of the cocaine
would have justified the government's warrantless search because
when contraband becomes readily apparent, the owner's privacy
expectation is destroyed.' 79 However, absent a plain view showing
of the contraband, the government's reopening of the unsealed
package in Jacobsen qualifies as a fourth amendment search and
requires a warrant.
The Field Test
In reviewing the DEA agent's field test, the Court relied on
175. Id. at 657. When the results of a private search are in plain view to government
agents, the government may justifiably reexamine the material. The reexamination may
not, however, "exceed the scope of the private search unless [the government] has the
right to make an independent search." Id.
176. Id. at 653. The Court also stated that lawful possession of the boxes by the FBI
does not automatically give them license to search the box without prior judicial approval. Id.
177. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983), where it was held that the
plain view observation of contraband by an officer legitimately on the premises infringes
upon no privacy interest since the owner merely retains possessory and ownership interests at best. Id.; see also Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1665 (White, J., concurring). The warrantless search of a container based upon probable cause violates the fourth amendment.
It is clear that containers which conceal the contents from plain view are afforded full
fourth amendment protection. Id. (White, J., concurring).
179. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1665-66 (White, J., concurring) (government may seize
item in plain view because once official is justifiably in a situation to observe object the
owner's privacy expectation is destroyed); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 (1983)
(contraband found in plain view by officer may be seized without a warrant since no
invasion of privacy occurs).
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United States v. Place"'° and found that the conduct did not constitute a search."" The intrusion in Place, however, can be distinguished from that of Jacobsen. The chemical test conducted in
Jacobsen of the examined contents of the package required the
physical destruction of a portion of the substance.1 2 The canine
sniff test in Place required no physical invasion or destruction of
183
any substance.
Further, as the Jacobsen dissent pointed out, the overly broad
holdings of both Jacobsen and Place pose serious threats to traditional fourth amendment principles by removing established limitations on the scope and type of permissible criminal
investigations.1 1 4 Opponents of Place similarly claim that its expansive language threatens the integrity of the fourth amendment
and may validate advanced law enforcement techniques of the future.1 8 5 Moreover, precluding certain techniques from the scope of
the fourth amendment ignores the fact that such activity intrudes
upon legitimate privacy expectations in situations where the test is
inaccurate. 18 6 An individual innocent of possessing contraband
may repeatedly be subjected to physical searches and detention of
his person and property without a fourth amendment remedy.187
IMPACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Supreme Court's holding in Jacobsen favors the policy of
encouraging law enforcement activities.'8 8 The circumvention of
the fourth amendment requirements is, however, particularly detrimental to privacy interests in situations involving private searches
because the intrusive activities of private parties are not constitutionally sanctioned in any way.189 While the Court has interpreted
fourth amendment principles to accommodate existing policy con180. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
181. 104 S. Ct. at 1662-63.
182. Id. at 1662-63.
183. Place, 103 S. Ct. at 2644.
184. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Note, Fourth Amendment - Limited Luggage Seizures Valid on Reasonable Suspicion, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1225, 1244 (1983) (unless inaccuracies in dog sniff tests result in nondetection, innocent person may be subject to
warrantless privacy invasions).
187. Id.
188. Once it has been determined that a particular activity is not a fourth amendment
search or seizure, the fourth amendment proscriptions become inapplicable and the government is free to act without a warrant. United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1669
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
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siderations and societal trends, 190 it is unlikely that the fourth
amendment's scope will be expanded to protect against intrusive
private action. Such an extension would be inappropriate given the
amendment's historical development.' 9 '
The danger inherent in the Jacobsen opinion is the possibility
that the government's activity, whenever preceded by a private
party's encroachment of another's privacy, would fully escape
fourth amendment scrutiny. Such a "non-search" classification of
government activity not only alleviates the need for a warrant, but
also technically affords the government unbounded discretion to
act in any fashion, reasonable or unreasonable.
A more appropriate analysis of governmental activity which follows a private party search requires an examination of the individual's subjective and objective privacy expectations under the facts
of each particular case.192 If an individual possesses a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a particular package, the opening of the
package by the government should constitute a fourth amendment
search. 193 The government's activity should then be subject to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement, unless an exception to
that rule applies.' 94
The holding of Jacobsen with respect to the field test reveals a
similar commitment to law enforcement. The use of the dissent's
traditional fourth amendment analysis would provide greater protection of privacy interests by guaranteeing judicial scrutiny of all
potentially intrusive law enforcement procedures. 95 It is unlikely,
190. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 10, 72 and accompanying text.
192. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1671 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Under the
traditional approach, law enforcement techniques would be scrutinized in each situation
so as to protect fourth amendment rights. Under the dissent's approach, if an individual
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy, the government's field test would be tantamount to a search. The search, however, could be found to be reasonable in light of its
minimally intrusive nature.
193. See Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. at 1670-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Note,
supra note 186, at 1244. The commentator suggests that once an individual's privacy
expectation has been assessed, the Terry standards would be more appropriate than the
Place analysis. The activity constituting a search would be scrutinized on a case-by-case
basis. Under Terry, the dogsniff test may withstand fourth amendment scrutiny if it is
determined that the test, as a search, was justifiable and the intrusiveness was minimal.
Id. at 1244; see also Katz and Dogs: Canine Inspections and the Fourth Amendment, 44
LA. L. REV. 1093, 1106 (1984) (placing dog sniffs within the realm of the fourth amendment would facilitate judicial examination of reasonableness, which would include an
analysis of the privacy interest, suspicion involved, intrusiveness and scope of sniff in each
case).
194. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 59; see, e.g., E. EBERLE, Prior Restraint of Expression Through
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however, that the Court will abandon the current trend toward encouraging the employment of effective law enforcement techniques
96
and avoiding unnecessary application of the exclusionary rule.
In the future, the Court may wisely choose to limit the holdings of
Place and Jacobsen in recognition of the potential danger in cases
involving the use of unforeseen sophisticated surveillance
techniques.
CONCLUSION

In response to a conflict among the circuits with respect to the
proper analysis of governmental searches which follow private
searches, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v.
Jacobsen. The Court's broad holding removes virtually all governmental searches which follow on the heels of the private search
from the fourth amendment's scope. A traditional fourth amendment analysis would more appropriately scrutinize the activity
without threatening the integrity of the amendment.
The Jacobsen Court's analysis of the field test may potentially
be employed in future cases to validate other seemingly controlled
types of investigative techniques which could adversely affect
fourth amendment interests. Such techniques should not receive
blanket exemptions from the fourth amendment's strictures. The
Court should examine the techniques on a case-by-case basis in
light of the surrounding circumstances. Such an approach would
provide more flexibility while preserving the integrity of the fourth
amendment.
KIM

A. LAMBERT

the PrivateSearch Doctrine, 17 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 171, 197 (although private search
doctrine poses threat to first amendment interests, the doctrine is nonetheless an accepted
part of fourth amendment law); Note, supra note 66, at 455 (the outdated approach of the
courts in limiting fourth amendment scrutiny to governmental activity is stubbornly adhered to); Note, PrivateSearches and Seizures: United States v. Kelly and United States
v. Sherwin, 90 HARV. L. REV. 463 (current trend with respect to fourth amendment
evinces desire to encourage effective law enforcement).
196. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.

